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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff & Respondent,
-vsCRAIG DERRICKSON MARVELL,
Defendant & Appellant.

Case No.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State of Utah against Craig
Derrickson Marvell, Defendant and Appellant herein, charging him with the crime
of murder in the first degree in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 202 (1)
(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon County, State of Utah, on
the 8th day of August, 1975, after a jury t r i a l , the Defendant was found guilty of
the offense as charged. The Defendant, a n death-qualified" jury having been empanelled, elected that further proceedings on the issue of penalty be conducted
before the Court, and following such hearing before the Court, on the 12th day of
August, 1975, the Court sentenced the Defendant to death by shooting.

m
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
That this cause be remanded to the trial court for a new trial, or, in
the alternative, that the death sentence imposed by the trial court be set aside,
and this case remanded to the trial court for the imposition of a sentence of life
imprisonment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant was charged with first degree murder, and tried jointly
with Gypsy Allen Codianna and Irvin Paul Duns don, who were also charged with
the same offense.
A chain of circumstantial evidence was presented by the State which failed
specifically identify the appellant as the murderor of the deceased. An exhaustive
review of the r e p o r t e r ' s transcript of the trial, convinces one of the fact that therj
is not one scintilla of evidence that the Appellant himself had any motive to kill,
or that he killed, the deceased.

The conviction of the Appellant by the jury neces

sarily had to be based solely upon ,f guilt by association. Tf
At the pre-sentence hearing, held before the Honorable Edward Sheya,
sitting without a jury, the Defendant Irvin Paul Dunsdon testified in his own behalf that until the very night of the murder, he did not know and had never met
the Appellant, Craig Derrickson Marvell (Rep. T r . p . 581 & 597), but met him at
the "keg-party 11 where beer, drugs and marijuana were consumed and used.

That

the Appellant (strange to say), for no known reason engaged him in a conversation
relating to the victim Hogan, but expressed no intention regarding the man.
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(Rep. T r . p. 593). That he, Dunsdon, intended to punch and lump up Hogan a
bit (Rep. T r . p. 591 & 593), because Hogan's testimony had put one of his biker
friends in jail (Rep. T r . p . 592); and he admitted that he had hit Hogan in the back
of the head with a pair of b r a s s knuckles (Rep. T r . p. 591), but that the Appellant Craig Marvell, for no apparent reason, and lacking all evidence of motive,
wielded the gun and shot the man.
Dunsdon emphatically denied that,while he was the only party to the crime
who had a motive to injure the deceased, that he was endeavoring to hang the onus
of the crime on the Appellant Marvell, and thereby salvage some advantage for
himself, even though he clearly motivated the course of events that resulted in
the death of the deceased.

(Rep. T r . pgs. 578-600).
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS VOIR DIRE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS, AND
IN DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEAT A NEW PANEL.
The Court's voir dire implied the defendant's guilt of first degree murder
when the Court said, "let's make it apply to this case, and say these defendants
(are) guilty of first degree murder * * * . " (Rep. T r . p. 15). Thereafter, the
Court placed all of its emphasis on the need to empanel a "death-qualified" jury.
When the prospective juror Lydia Palacios stated that she didn't think she could
under any circumstances vote for capital punishment, the Court badgered h e r
until she finally agreed that she couldn't do it, and she was then excused. (Rep.
[3]
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T r . p . 18). The same applied to the juror M r s . Alda Alger who stated that she
didn't believe that she could vote to impose the death penalty, and was excused.
(Rep. T r . p. 20-21). On the contrary, when the juror Powell stated, "If he was
guilty, I could vote for;" meaning the death penalty (Rep. T r . p . 20); and when
the juror Mr. Christensen stated, "If they are found guilty by the evidence I believe in capital punishment;" (Rep. T r . p . 22) the Court failed to as pointedly inquire of these j u r o r s , or any of the other j u r o r s , who evidenced no objection to
the death penalty, whether they had an unwavering death penalty bias. As a r e sult, the jury empaneled was a so-called "death qualified" jury; was unbalanced
and biased; and counsel was left with no means of determining whether the Court
itself was unequivocally death orientated in capital c a s e s , and counsel was compelled to waive a hearing before the "death-qualified" jury on the issue of penalty,
and request that the hearing be conducted before the Court, pursuant to Section
76-3-207, U . C . A . 1953, as amended. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510;
Utah Law Review, Vol. 1969 No. 1, p. 154.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT CRAIG DERRICKSON MARVELL WAS NOT PERSONALLY
PRESENT AT ALL STAGES OF THE TRIAL.
The Court went into session in chambers (Rep. T r . pgs. 37-51) when
neither the Defendant Craig Marvell nor his attorney were present, and without
their consent, and undertook to hear arguments on a motion for severance as to
the co-defendant Irvin Paul Duns don, and which motion directly involved the
question of the guilt of the Appellant Craig Marvell on the m e r i t s , it having been
[4]
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represented to the Court by counsel for the State, without supporting evidence,
that the Defendant Dunsdon was a participant in a l e s s e r degree than the Defendant Craig Marvell. (Rep. T r . p . 42; 48); and neither the Defendant Craig Marveil, nor his attorney, had waived the right to be present at that s e c r e t session
of the Court in chambers; all of which was in violation of the constitutional right
of the Defendant Craig Marvell to appear and defend in person or counsel.

Ar-

ticle 1, Sec. 12, Constitition of Utah; and in violation of Section 77-1-8(1), and
Section 77-27-3, U. C. A. 1953 which provides: "If the prosecution is for a felony,
the defendant must be personally present at the t r i a l * * * . " Neither the Defendant Craig Marvell, nor his attorney, were aware that the Court went into
session in chambers without their presence until the receipt of the reporter's/
transcript, and a reading of the proceedings had at such hearing and held without
notice to them, or either of them, and to which unlawful proceedings they had no
opportunity to object. State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 51 P . (2d) 1052.
POINT III
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY BY THE COURT WAS IN VIOLATION
OF THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, IT BEING CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
In the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L . E d . 2d 346, 9 2 S . C H .
2726,

(hereinafter referred to as the Furman case), replete with historical ref-

erences; pertinent citations of authority; applicable texts; commentaries; and
relevant statistical data, specific referencesto which, for the purpose of brevity,
a r e not herein repeated, several members of the Court indicated that the impo-

[51
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sition and carrying out of the death penalty, per s e , constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, and is unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Brennan, in an exhaustive concurring opinion in the Furmar.
case, stated that death is an unusually severe punishment, "unusual in its pain,
in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable
to death in t e r m s of physical and mental suffering."
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring in the F u r man case speaks of the penalt
of death as being unique in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in oui
concept of humanity.
In his dissenting opinion, based on the concept that the matter of designating penalties for profitable conduct should be left to the discretion of the legislative branch of government, rather than the judiciary, Mr. Justice Blackmun
nevertheless said: I!I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and,
indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspecigof physical distress
and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That distaste is butt r e s s e d by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful purpose that can be
demonstrated. * * * It is antagonistic to any sense of 'reverence for l i f e . | f !
And so we find in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, as well as in the dissents, that there is relative unanimity in the fact,
standing alone, without further consideration, that the death penalty is cruel and
inhuman punishment; and the Appellant, Craig Marvell, so contends in the instant
[6]
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case before this Court.
POINT IV
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED SHOULD BE REVERSED,
AND THE CAUSE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR THE SENTENCE OF
THE APPELLANT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT, PURSUANT TO SEC. 76-3-207(4)
U . C . A . 1953.
In the Furman case, Mr. Justice Douglas observed that juries or judges,
as the case may be, have practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused
live or die, and he said: n * * * we deal with a system of law and justice that
leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether
defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under these
laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12." And Mr. Justice Stewart, in the
Furman case commented that legislative policy is defined not by what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion
conferred upon them.
The Utah legislature, apparently yielding to the collective wish for vengence and violent solution to the problem of crime, has sought to circumvent the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Furman case, and has
adopted a two-stage t r i a l system; Section 76-3-207(2), which in effect again leaves
it to the untrammeled discretion of judge or jury whether an accused lives or dies;
leaves it to the discretion of jury or judge to decide whether the defendant's h i s tory of prior criminal activity is significant; whether or not the defendant was, in
171
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the opinion of the judge o r jury, acting under the influence of extreme mental 02
emotional disturbance; whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or
under the substantial domination of another person; whether or not the capacity
of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially im
paired as a result of mental di s e a s e , intoxication o r the influence of drugs;
whether defendant's youth should be considered; whether, if the defendant was an
accomplice, was his participation relatively minor; and whether any other nondefined facts, in the discretion of the jury o r judge, should be considered in
mitigation of the penalty. All of these circumstances a r e relative, and a r e left
to the uncontrolled discretion of jury or judge - - and, under the ruling in the
Furman case, the statute, Sec. 76-3-207(2) is unconstitutional.
In the instant case, virtually disregarding the standards attempted to be
set forth by the legislature, the Court in its discretion undertook to sentence
Craig Marvell to death. In this case, as heretofore noted, a "Death-Qualified n
jury was empaneled, and the determination of the penalty was therefore left to
the judicial discretion of the Court, with no means of determing the preconceived
opinion or conviction of the Court as related to the imposition of the death penalty. What happened was that the Court "passed the buck" back to the legislature
and stated: " * * * the legislature has reimposed it (the death penalty) here in
Utah, and in a proper case the Court is band to follow the law as set down in the
books by the l e g i s l a t u r e . " (Rep. T r . p . 650). And, supposedly, in support of the
legislature, the Court imposed the death penalty. The Court's responsibility,
[8]
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whatever its personal conviction as related to capital punishment might be, was
to courageously support the Constitution of the United States, and to follow the
law as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Furman case.
Instead, the Court undertook to sentence Craig Marvell, a m a r r i e d man with four
children (Rep. T r . p . 515); a man who was never convicted of a felony in any
Court in this country (Rep. T r . p . 519); a man who was the victim of drugs
(Rep. T r . pgs. 495-98-99; 510; 516-18; 522; 524-525; 528); to sentence Craig
Marvell to death apparently on the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant Dunsdon, and bolstered by the representations made by counsel for the State in the s e s sion of court held outside the presence of Craig Marvell and his counsel (Rep. T r .
pgs. 42 & 48) - - Dunsdon, the only defendant who admittedly had a motive and
sought to injure the deceased (Rep. T r . p. 596); the defendant who was found saturated with the victim's blood (Rep. T r . pgs. 79 & 81); the one defendant who endeavored to exonerate himself at the expense of Craig Marvell who had no reason
to beat up the deceased with b r a s s knucles (Rep. T r . p. 591), let alone murder
him.
In sentencing Craig Marvell to death the Court clearly was taking the position that retribution was demanded; that the death sentence was imposed because the accused deserved it; and that naked ven^ance was required. The Court
said that if this was not a case warranting the death penalty, that it would be hard
to imagine a case that would warrant that penalty.

(Rep. T r . p. 650). Mr. J u s -

[9]
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tice Brennan in the Furman case said that it was difficult to believe that any sta
to-day wishes to proclaim adhereence to "naked vengeance. 1 '
The Utah legislature in the enactment of Section 76-3-207(2), well aware
of its doubtful validity in the light of the Furman decision, and of the high probability of its failure to meet the necessary requirements posed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, concluded its legislative effort to reimpose the death
penalty by enacting Section 76-3-207(4), wherein it provided that in the event the
death penalty in a capital felony should be held unconstitutional, that the court ha^
ing jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death, shall sentence such
person to life imprisonment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Appellant, Craig Derrickson Marvell, respectfully submits, that on the basis of the foregoing points, that the judgment rendered in the
trial court should be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial; or, in
the alternative, that this Court should order that this Appellant's sentence of
death be set aside and vacated, and the trial court directed to impose a sentence
of life imprisonment.
^ctfully submitted,
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